Including financial services in preferential trade agreements : lessons of international experience for China by Stephanou, Constantinos
Policy ReseaRch WoRking PaPeR 4898
Including Financial Services  
in Preferential Trade Agreements
Lessons of International Experience for China
Constantinos Stephanou
The World Bank
East Asia and the Pacific Region
Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Department
Financial and Private Sector Development and Trade Units
April 2009
WPS4898Produced by the Research Support Team
Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy ReseaRch WoRking PaPeR 4898
The objective of this paper is to address the main 
considerations for China of including financial services 
in its preferential trade agreements. The paper briefly 
reviews China’s financial liberalization process and the 
state of its domestic financial system, discusses the main 
considerations of including financial services in China’s 
preferential trade agreements, compares and contrasts 
the different ‘architectural’ approaches that have been 
This paper—a product of the Financial and Private Sector Development and Trade units, Poverty Reduction and Economic 
Management Department in East Asia and the Pacific—is part of a larger effort in the department to  shed light on the 
treatment of financial services in preferential trade agreements.. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the 
Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at cstephanou@worldbank.org.  
used by countries to include financial services in such 
agreements, and identifies good practices in preparing 
for financial services negotiations. Particular emphasis is 
placed on lessons from Latin American preferential trade 
agreements, given their more frequent and extensive 
coverage of financial services compared with other 
regions. 
 
Including Financial Services in Preferential 
Trade Agreements: Lessons of International 
























Keywords: China, trade agreements, financial services, financial liberalization. 
 
 
                                                 
 Constantinos Stephanou (cstephanou@worldbank.org) is a Senior Financial Economist in the World 
Bank’s Financial and Private Sector Development Vice Presidency. The paper is based on a workshop on 
the same topic that took place in Beijing in early 2008; it reflects solely the views of its author and does not 
necessarily reflect the views of the World Bank Group or its Executive Directors. The author would like to 
thank Pierre Sauvé, Sebastian Saez, Mona Haddad, Zijing Niu, Ardo Hanson, the Chinese authorities and 
financial sector interviewees for their valuable comments and support. 
  1Table of Contents 
 
I. INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................3 
II. THE STATE OF FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION IN CHINA............................4 
Liberalization of trade in financial services................................................................... 4 
Financial liberalization and the domestic financial system ........................................... 5 
III. INCLUDING FINANCIAL SERVICES IN PTAS – KEY CONSIDERATIONS..7 
Approaches to liberalizing trade in financial services................................................... 7 
Including financial services in PTAs – international experience................................... 8 
Implications for China.................................................................................................... 9 
IV. THE ARCHITECTURE OF FINANCIAL SERVICES IN PTAS......................11 
GATS versus NAFTA template...................................................................................... 11 
The architecture of financial services in PTAs – international experience.................. 12 
Implications for China.................................................................................................. 14 
V. PREPARING FOR FINANCIAL SERVICES NEGOTIATIONS......................15 
Negotiating financial services in PTAs – international experience.............................. 15 
Implications for China.................................................................................................. 16 
APPENDIX I: LESSONS FROM LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN ....18 
PTA developments in LCR............................................................................................ 18 
Coverage of financial services in LCR PTAs................................................................ 18 
Country case studies: negotiating team, strategy and consultation process................ 21 
Financial services liberalization commitments compared to the GATS....................... 23 
Financial services liberalization commitments compared to the status quo................ 23 
Preferential nature of de novo liberalization commitments ......................................... 24 





  2 
I. Introduction 
 
The objective of this paper is to address the main considerations for China of 
including financial services
1 in its preferential trade agreements (PTAs). China has 
made significant progress in liberalizing its domestic financial system since its WTO 
accession in 2001, and it is currently engaged in multiple bilateral (Australia, Singapore, 
Peru, Iceland) and plurilateral (GCC, SACU) PTA negotiations in addition to undertaking 
feasibility studies for more such agreements. The question arises as to whether – and how 
– financial services should be included in such PTAs, as well as the implications in terms 
of the negotiations preparation process. The paper addresses these issues by reviewing 
international experience and placing it in the context of China’s financial system 
circumstances and policy priorities. Particular emphasis is placed on lessons from Latin 
American PTAs given their more frequent and extensive coverage of financial services 
compared to trade agreements in other regions. 
 
The paper is structured as follows: 
  Section II briefly describes China’s financial liberalization process (including in 
financial services trade) and state of the domestic financial system; 
  Section III discusses the main considerations (both positive and negative) of 
including financial services in China’s PTAs; 
  Section IV compares and contrasts the different ‘architectural’ approaches used 
by countries to include financial services in their PTAs; 
  Section V reviews good practices in preparing for financial services negotiations 
to facilitate the overall process and achieve the desired outcomes  
Finally, Appendix I summarizes the experience of including financial services in 
FTAs for selected countries – Chile, Colombia and Costa Rica – in the Latin America and 
the Caribbean (LCR) region
2. 
                                                 
1 The definition of financial services in this paper covers banking, insurance and insurance-related services, 
as well as other financial services. 
2 The Appendix is based on Goncalves and Stephanou (April 2007). 
  3II. The State of Financial Liberalization in China  
 
The liberalization of trade in financial services is only a subset of the broader 
financial liberalization agenda. The purpose of the former is to increase financial 
market access and remove discriminatory and other access-impeding barriers to foreign 
competition. By contrast, the chief purpose of the latter is to remove distortions in 
domestic financial systems – for example, interest rate and capital account controls, 
directed lending policies, restrictions on intra-sectoral activities, preferential treatment of 
publicly-owned banks, entry barriers for new operators – that impede competition and the 
allocation of capital to its most productive and profitable uses. Financial liberalization 
can be conceptually divided into domestic financial reform and capital account opening, 
and there is a broad literature on its appropriate speed and sequencing. In that context, 
trade liberalization in financial services is part of overall financial liberalization, although 
in practice there are typically strong overlaps between the two types of policy reforms
3.  
 
Liberalization of trade in financial services 
 
China’s accession to the WTO in 2001 marked a watershed with regards to its 
process of liberalization in financial services trade. As others have already pointed 
out
4, China’s financial services commitments – which were phased in over a 5-year 
period following accession – were among the most radical ever negotiated in the context 
of the WTO. Although the structure of commitments was similar to that made by other 
countries (e.g. more liberalization in mode 3 and in banking services
5), the degree of 
liberalization – both in terms of market access and national treatment – went significantly 
beyond the regulatory status quo as of 2001 and featured far-reaching pre-commitments 
to future market opening
6. This reflected both China’s relatively low starting point (high 
entry barriers) and the asymmetric nature of the accession’s bargaining process (non-
reciprocal concessions). China’s commitments in certain banking services are very liberal 
compared to both developed and developing countries since they allow no discriminatory 
measures, although their commercial value has been limited thus far for a variety of 
reasons (see below). By contrast, commitments made in insurance and (particularly) 
securities services generally lag those made by developed countries in the GATS. 
 
                                                 
3 Trade in financial services is often linked to capital movements, notably in the context of the 
establishment of a commercial presence which requires inward direct investment. Certain types of cross-
border financial transactions may also involve capital movements and hence require some measure of 
capital account opening as an inherent part of the service provision. In addition, countries (including China) 
often seek to promote greater policy coherence by opening up domestic financial markets to foreign 
competition in the context of broader financial reform efforts. 
4 See Bhattasali, Li, and Martin eds. (2004) for details. 
5 According to the GATS, the four modes of supplying services are via cross-border provision (mode 1), 
consumption abroad by domestic nationals (mode 2), commercial presence via local establishment by 
foreign providers (mode 3), and via the temporary entry of foreign individuals for this purpose (mode 4). 
6 Commitments were phased in following WTO entry, and culminated in the elimination by December 
2006 of several mode 3 restrictions on form of establishment, geographical presence and business scope, 
particularly for banking services. As is common with the vast majority of trade agreements, China’s mode 
4 commitments in financial services are horizontal in nature and fairly restrictive. 
  4With two special exceptions, China has not gone beyond its WTO financial 
services commitments in the PTAs that it has completed to-date. In particular, the 
Closer Economic Partnership Agreements (CEPAs) with Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region (SAR) and Macau SAR in 2004 granted service providers owned 
and controlled by firms (juridical persons) from those territories preferential access to 
China’s market ahead of the WTO liberalization schedule. Most of these preferences 
were time-bound and expired once China’s accession commitments were fully phased-in. 
The two CEPAs can be considered as special cases since they were intended to promote 
deeper integration in the broader Chinese market. By contrast, recently-completed 
bilateral PTAs have either not included commitments on financial services (Chile 2006, 
Pakistan 2007, ASEAN-TIS 2007) or have merely restated the Parties’ respective 
commitments under the GATS in the relevant Annex (New Zealand 2008).  
 
Financial liberalization and the domestic financial system 
 
Although China’s financial system has been successful at mobilizing savings and 
is becoming more liberalized, it is not yet fully playing the role of allocating savings 
efficiently to the economy. China undertook financial liberalization in a slow and 
gradual approach since the early 1980s, and accelerated such efforts subsequently to its 
WTO accession
7. However, there remain significant gaps in this process, including strict 
controls on the capital account
8, limited currency convertibility, only partly liberalized 
interest rates, and insufficient competition from private (domestic and foreign) financial 
institutions
9. On the macroeconomic front, this policy has contributes to significant 
foreign reserves accumulation and a ‘long debt, short equity’ international financial 
position
10. The domestic financial system remains heavily bank-dominated and relatively 
unsophisticated in assessing and pricing credit risk, with large regional disparities in 
terms of access to credit. Banks continue to earn the vast majority of their revenues from 
loans, primarily to large state-owned corporate clients. By contrast, firm financing from 
capital markets is limited; while the domestic banking system’s credit portfolio exceeds 
150 percent of GDP, the corporate bond market only represents around one percent of 
GDP. The equity market’s importance has increased substantially since 2004, but a large 
part of the increase has been due to the revaluation of existing assets and the public 
listing of state-owned firms (including banks) with small amounts of free float
11. 
 
Entry by foreign financial services providers has increased in recent years, albeit 
at a slow pace. In addition to strategic non-controlling investments in local banks, 
                                                 
7 See Lane and Schmukler (February 2007), Calomiris ed. (2007), and Mattoo et al. eds (2007) for a 
description of the evolution of the financial liberalization reforms. 
8 The Qualified Domestic Institutional Investors (QDII) and Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors 
(QFII) programs by the Chinese authorities allow domestic/foreign institutional investors to access local 
and foreign capital markets respectively; however, these programs have been relatively small to-date. 
9 See Lardy (September 2008) for an analysis of costs of financial repression in the Chinese banking sector. 
10 This means that China’s stock of international financial assets (outward investments) is mostly in the 
form of debt while its stock of liabilities (inward investments) is mostly in the form of equity. 
11 See McKinsey Global Institute (May 2006), Allen et al. (2008), WTO (April 2008), and the China-US 
Symposium discussions (http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/pifs/chinaus.html) for recent reviews of the 
Chinese financial system. 
  5several foreign banks have established branches and (more recently) subsidiaries in 
China; however, their share only amounted to around 2.4 percent of system-wide assets 
in 2007
12. Insurance penetration by foreign providers, primarily in the form of equal-
participation joint ventures with local partners, has increased at a faster pace, with their 
market share in terms of premiums rising to around 6 percent in 2007. Foreign providers 
tend to be concentrated in a few large cities where they command a much greater market 
share than they do at the national level. Foreign participation in domestic securities 
markets is even lower than in banking and insurance because of greater entry restrictions 
(minority ownership in joint ventures) and a moratorium on new licenses, while overall 
cross-border trade in financial services is minimal due to capital account restrictions
13. 
As a result, even though domestic financial institutions benefit from access to foreign 
capital and technical expertise (e.g. risk management, product development etc.), 
relatively little has been achieved to-date in terms of increased competition or greater 
product variety outside a few major cities. 
                                                
 
The slow pace of foreign entry partly arises from policymakers’ emphasis on 
liberalizing in a gradual, orderly manner to ensure financial stability and allow 
domestic financial institutions to build up expertise and commercial orientation. 
Low penetration can be partly attributed to the fact that foreign financial institutions were 
only recently allowed to enter and compete in various parts of the financial system. 
However, there have also been complaints about China’s implementation record of its 
WTO financial services commitments and of the existence of regulations and 
administrative procedures (particularly of a prudential nature) that unduly increase the 
cost and slow down the pace of foreign expansion, effectively acting as indirect and de 
facto (if not necessarily de jure) discriminatory barriers
14. Although some of these 
measures may reflect the focus of the authorities on financial stability or their desire to 
allow sufficient time for domestic providers to adjust, others are an inevitable 
consequence of China’s momentous ‘catching up’ process in financial sector regulatory 
policies and the adoption of international prudential standards and codes (‘soft laws’). 
 
 
12 According to Fitch Ratings (May 2007), 29 Chinese banks, accounting for around 53 percent of system-
wide assets, have been invested in by foreign banks over the past few years.  
13 In spite of significant de novo liberalization as part of the WTO accession, China’s cross-border financial 
services trade commitments remain significantly lower than those made by the majority of developed 
countries in the GATS. As a result and according to data from SAFE, China’s total cross-border trade in 
financial services (both exports and imports) for 2005 amounted to only around US$300 million. 
14 Examples include the inability of foreign banks to acquire more than 20 percent individually – or 25 
percent in total – in domestic banks (differences in interpretation on the right of establishment under WTO 
commitments) as well as regulatory restrictions or delays on local incorporation, the extent of foreign 
currency funding/lending, the speed of branch expansion, the introduction of new financial products, the 
provision of electronic payments processing services by foreign credit card companies, the use of foreign 
reinsurance, the licensing of new securities firms, and the supply of financial information services by 
foreign providers. See USTR (December 2007), China’s Transitional Review Mechanism correspondence 
in the WTO Committee on Trade in Financial Services (www.wto.org), the Banking & Securities Working 
Group section of the European Chamber of Commerce (2007) report, and PricewaterhouseCoopers 
(September 2007 and June 2008) for more details. 
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III. Including Financial Services in PTAs – Key Considerations 
 
The liberalization of trade in financial services is helpful to, but is not a panacea 
for, domestic financial system modernization. Liberalization is desirable in order to 
serve the development needs of the domestic financial system by improving efficiency 
and the allocation of resources via healthy competition with foreign providers. There 
already exists a substantial body of literature on the positive relationship between finance 
and growth
15 and on the spillover effects of foreign (particularly bank) entry
16, although 
there are also important sequencing/speed considerations and other preconditions to the 
process of financial liberalization
17. More specifically, the size of benefits from trade 
liberalization in financial services depends critically on the market’s attractiveness that 
will determine the extent to which foreign providers will take advantage of the 
opportunity (the so-called ‘if you build it, will they come’ argument), as well as on 
complementary regulatory reforms. The latter include the adoption of international 
prudential standards, the elimination of financial repression measures, and the 
strengthening of the enabling ‘financial infrastructure’ environment (i.e. rule of law, 
credit bureaus, collateral registries, accounting and auditing standards, payment systems 
etc.). It is important to note that such reforms go well beyond trade policy and cannot 
therefore be tackled solely in the context of a trade agreement per se.  
 
Approaches to liberalizing trade in financial services 
 
Countries have achieved the liberalization of trade in financial services in three 
main ways: (i) unilaterally, by opening their financial systems to international 
competition in the context of domestic reform efforts; (ii) at the multilateral level under 
the auspices of the WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS); and (iii) on 
a reciprocal or preferential basis by concluding bilateral or plurilateral PTAs, of which 
free trade agreements (FTAs) are the most common type. Depending on the country 
context and circumstances, one or more of these approaches has been used to liberalize 
specific sub-sectors and/or modes of financial services provision
18.  
 
Autonomous market opening has been the most common form of liberalizing 
trade in financial services. Most developed countries have adopted such a strategy, 
progressively liberalizing their financial markets over a relatively long period of time. 
Many developing countries followed (or are following) the same path, although in some 
cases – such as Mexico – the advent of a crisis led to or even accelerated the market 
opening process. When the time came to negotiate the GATS, these countries typically 
bound at (or below) the regulatory status quo in their schedules, consolidating the actual 
degree of openness prevailing at the time of the agreement’s entry into force. China and 
some recent WTO accession countries (e.g. Vietnam), are the clearest examples of 
                                                 
15 See Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (January 2008) for a recent overview of the evidence. 
16 See Clarke et al. (Spring 2003) for a review of the literature. 
17 See, for example, International Monetary Fund (June 2007). 
18 See Saez (December 2006), Arbeláez, Flórez and Salazar (August 2006), and Echandi (September 2006) 
for the cases of Chile, Colombia and Costa Rica respectively. 
  7liberalization of trade in financial services in a multilateral context, while there are few 
examples of de novo liberalization stemming from PTAs (see Appendix I).  
 
Including financial services in PTAs – international experience 
 
Broadly speaking, there are three main reasons why countries negotiating PTAs 
include financial services disciplines and commitments in them. The first, and 
typically the most important reason, is the existence of offensive interests in this sector 
and of asymmetric bargaining powers between the negotiating counterparts. This should 
not be surprising: a trade agreement is essentially a mercantilist exercise, so the inclusion 
of certain sensitive sectors such as financial services reflects the perceived interests and 
negotiating strengths of the partners. In such cases, a country includes financial services 
commitments either because it is forced to do so by the negotiating partner (perhaps as a 
quid pro quo for securing market access in another sector), or because it has offensive 
interests in financial services and is able to pursue them in the markets of trading partners 
– typically in a North-South PTA context (see Appendix I). The second, less frequently 
used reason is to use such trade agreements as a vehicle to either ‘lock in’ recent 
unilateral liberalization or to advance the government’s reform agenda in this sector by 
pre-committing to future market opening, thereby overcoming any lingering resistance 
from domestic constituencies and providing a positive signal to foreign investors. This 
seems to have been the case for financial services commitments undertaken by, for 
example, Argentina in the GATS (Bouzas and Soltz, December 2005) and Costa Rica in 
the CAFTA-DR-USA trade agreement (Echandi, 2006). Finally, countries can decide to 
include financial services in PTAs for strategic/political, rather than purely economic, 
reasons. The clearest examples of such cases involve plurilateral regional trading bloc 
initiatives, such as the Andean Community and Mercosur in LCR
19. 
 
Arguments in favor of including financial services in PTAs have to be weighed 
against potential drawbacks. These primarily consist of regulatory sensitivities about 
further domestic financial markets opening and the related fear of limiting ‘policy space’ 
in this sector; potential distortions that could arise from giving preferential treatment to 
specific counterparts (especially in cases where first-mover advantage is important); 
strategic considerations (commitments made with one PTA counterpart can become a 
floor in multilateral or other bilateral trade negotiations); and the administrative problems 
that arise from managing a complex web of financial services liberalization rules with 
different countries. By far the most important factors until now have been regulatory 
sensitivities and strategic considerations, which have also been evident in the GATS 
negotiations and scheduling of commitments. 
 
International experience on the inclusion of financial services in PTAs is too 
recent to allow for an exhaustive evaluation of its effects on domestic financial 
systems and overall welfare. Although there have been numerous studies on the effects 
                                                 
19 A fourth, and more technical, reason for including financial services in a PTA would be to ensure that the 
agreement has “substantial sectoral coverage” and therefore constitutes a lawful exemption to the non-
discrimination requirement articulated in Art. V of the GATS. This issue can be addressed by not carving 
out a priori financial services from the scope of the agreement. 
  8of foreign entry (particularly banks) from unilateral liberalization, there is no comparable 
literature on the effects of PTA-induced financial liberalization. The effects do not appear 
a priori to be very significant since most PTAs seem to be primarily used to consolidate 
and ‘lock in’ existing unilateral liberalization rather than as means to actively promote 
further market opening and the process of domestic regulatory reform (see Appendix I). 
The lack of relevant data and methodologies to assess ex post (as opposed to estimate ex 
ante) impact remains an important constraint
20. However, even if a commonly accepted 
methodology for quantifying impact was established, the short time span since the 
negotiation or entry into force of PTAs that include financial services (the earliest, and 
rather atypical, example being the NAFTA in 1994) means that their contribution still 
cannot be fully assessed. In particular, financial services commitments and disciplines, 
including dispute settlement mechanisms, have not been put to the test during a market 
downturn or a significant revision of domestic financial system policy priorities, which is 
typically when constraints on ‘policy space’ and regulatory sensitivities more fully reveal 
their binding nature. 
 
Implications for China 
 
In the near term, the arguments for including financial services in China’s PTAs 
do not appear compelling. The main focus of its trade agreements until now has been to 
secure market access for goods exports and raw materials imports, as well as to 
institutionalize economic and political partnerships
21. China is not a major exporter of 
financial services and it will likely take some time for this situation to change. While 
additional liberalization of trade in financial services is necessary and beneficial for 
China, it is not obvious why it should take place on a bilateral basis as opposed to 
unilaterally (as is taking place now) or multilaterally (via the WTO). China can 
successfully resist efforts to liberalize financial services by most PTA counterparts with 
offensive interests in this sector (the de minimus expectation in such cases would be the 
lock-in of the regulatory status quo), although it could still be possible to provide such 
commitments in exchange for export interests in other sectors
22. This might be a 
legitimate trade-off in some instances, although it has been strongly resisted by financial 
sector policymakers in other countries on account of the sensitivities involved (see next 
section). This concern will likely resonate inside China as well, due to the incomplete 
financial liberalization process and the emphasis placed by its authorities on gradual, 
controlled market opening in order to avoid any crisis. 
 
Over the longer term, there are likely to be more factors driving the inclusion of 
financial services in China’s PTAs. The authorities are increasingly emphasizing the 
development of service export capabilities in an attempt to diversify the economy and 
                                                 
20 Unlike trade in goods, assessing the direct impact of including financial services in PTAs goes well 
beyond trade volumes to include various financial sector outcomes (depth, efficiency, stability etc.). See 
Hoekman (October 2006) for a recent review of the literature on liberalizing trade in services. 
21 See Hufbauer and Wong (October 2005) for a discussion. 
22 The fact that the GATS was completed after the end of the Uruguay Round turned financial services into 
a single-sector negotiation and may have provided incentives to developing countries with limited export 
interests in financial services to limit commitments in order to use them as future negotiating chips. 
  9move up the export ‘value chain’
23. This can also be seen in the financial sector where 
Chinese financial institutions have begun to cautiously expand abroad by establishing 
commercial presence in Hong Kong SAR and by taking minority equity stakes in mostly 
developed country financial institutions
24. The trend is likely to accelerate as domestic 
players acquire greater expertise and international experience, and as foreign reserve 
accumulation, cross-border activities by Chinese corporates and increased domestic 
competition provide incentives for foreign expansion. Moreover, as the domestic 
regulatory status quo eventually runs ahead of its WTO accession commitments, China 
will have more ‘room to give’ in financial services negotiations without generating de 
novo liberalization – an experience that several LCR countries have already gone through 
(see Appendix I). In such circumstances, including financial services in some of its future 
PTAs could provide benefits to the domestic industry (preferential treatment and/or 
unimpeded market access) that could not be secured multilaterally. China would then 
need to carefully define its offensive interests in financial services and determine how to 
best promote them via trade agreements. 
 
                                                 
23 Services (both exports and imports) only accounted for 10 percent of China’s foreign trade in 2006. The 
authorities’ plans to accelerate development of the services sector are outlined in the ‘11
th Five-Year Plan 
for National Economic and Social Development (2007-2012)’ and in the ‘Opinions of the State Council on 
Accelerating the Development of the Service Sector’ (March 2007). 
24 See Leung et al. (September 2008) for a report on Chinese banks’ cross-border investment activity. 
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IV. The Architecture of Financial Services in PTAs  
 
The way in which financial services are covered in PTAs is an important 
consideration for policymakers. In particular, the lack of a carve-out for financial 
services does not necessarily entail that all disciplines of the agreement will apply to that 
activity. Notwithstanding the overall architecture of the trade agreement, there is 
significant scope to maintain or introduce certain trade- and investment-restrictive 
measures, where needed, in financial services commitments or reservations
25. 
 
GATS versus NAFTA template 
 
PTAs that have developed disciplines on services in general (including financial 
services) have traditionally followed two distinct architectural models, one based on 
the GATS and the other on the NAFTA. GATS-type agreements cover the supply of 
services through four distinct supply modes, whereas NAFTA-type agreements feature 
separate chapters dealing with cross-border trade in services (modes 1 and 2 of GATS), 
investment (mode 3) and the temporary entry of business people (mode 4), the latter two 
being horizontal in character and applying to all subject areas covered by the PTA. The 
majority of PTAs negotiated by Western Hemisphere countries have followed the 
NAFTA template, although recent agreements have introduced some changes by mixing 
in elements of the two templates in the financial services chapter. GATS-type 
agreements, which have been more popular with European and Asian countries, treat 
investment in services as a mode of supply (commercial presence) under general 
disciplines on trade in services, while NAFTA-type agreements distinguish between 
cross-border trade and investment, the latter governed entirely by disciplines that apply 
across the board to all economic sectors. There are important nuances in the definition 
and scope of the two templates that policymakers need to be aware of (see Appendix I). 
 
The scheduling of commitments under the two templates is also different. GATS-
type agreements are based on a hybrid list approach to scheduling commitments, which 
combines elements of ‘positive’ or ‘bottom up’ listing (i.e. identifying the sectors and/or 
modes of supply concerned) and ‘negative’ or ‘top down’ listing (i.e. identifying the 
limitations and restrictions attached to specific commitments). By contrast, NAFTA-type 
PTAs use a negative-list or top-down approach in which trade and investment in financial 
services is assumed to be free from discriminatory treatment except for those non-
conforming measures that are explicitly included in annexes containing reservations. This 
approach obliges countries to list all non-conforming measures prior to an agreement’s 
entry into force (or subject to mutually agreed longer timeframes), otherwise they are 
deemed to be fully and automatically liberalized – a so-called “list it or lose it” approach.  
 
Each approach to scheduling commitments has its own benefits and drawbacks. 
Although both the negative and hybrid list approaches can achieve the same level of 
liberalization, the former is considered in theory to be more conducive to liberalization as 
                                                 
25 This section is partly based on Sauvé and Molinuevo (May 2008). 
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commitments to the extent that it typically locks in the regulatory status quo, except in 
those sectors where Members are explicitly allowed to retain the power to introduce new 
non-conforming measures. The detailed inventories of non-conforming measures that are 
appended to PTAs following a negative list approach, while technically more onerous to 
prepare, allow foreign investors and trade negotiators alike to obtain a comprehensive 
picture of a country’s regulatory landscape. By contrast, only the measures that apply to 
the sectors, sub-sectors and modes of supply entered in a country’s schedule are listed 
under the hybrid approach, which often differ from the regulatory status quo prevailing at 
the time that the commitment is scheduled. While neither of the two approaches inhibits 
the ability of host countries to preserve ‘policy space’, the hybrid approach has the 
advantage of affording greater latitude in determining the overall level of commitments 
and related regulatory conditions that might differ from actual practice, allegedly making 
it more flexible or “development-friendly” than the negative list approach. However, as 
Fink and Molinuevo (June 2007) note in their empirical analysis of 25 East Asian PTAs, 
the actual approach to scheduling commitments matters less than is commonly thought 
because the direction of causality between scheduling approaches and liberalization 
outcomes often runs both ways. 
 
The architecture of financial services in PTAs – international experience 
 
The architectural approach towards liberalization and regulatory disciplines in 
financial services is linked to the overall architecture found in PTAs and, in 
particular, their services and investment chapters. Countries that have followed the 
GATS approach for their general trade in services chapters have found it natural – and 
more familiar – to adopt such an approach towards financial services or to introduce a 
special chapter expanding on the GATS Annex on Financial Services. Similarly, 
countries that have previously relied on a NAFTA-like approach may have felt more at 
ease with a financial services chapter modelled after the latter agreement’s separate 
disciplines on financial services (including for investment). Interestingly, some countries 
have adopted a range of architectural approaches in their PTA coverage of financial 
services, which can be attributed to different trading partners (particularly if these are 
large OECD countries), changes in policy priorities, timing issues, preference for 
preserving greater policy space in some market segments/modes in financial services etc. 
 
There is a broad variety of approaches used by countries to cover financial 
services in their PTAs. These range from a general chapter on trade in services at one 
extreme to a self-contained financial services chapter at the other extreme
26. As Table 2 
shows, each of these approaches has its own characteristics, benefits and potential 
weaknesses. Of course, all competing architectural approaches can theoretically generate 
                                                 
26 The analysis excludes those PTAs that have explicitly carved out financial services. A less radical form 
of a carve-out is found in the Japan-Mexico FTA where, despite the presence of a chapter dedicated to 
financial services, the Parties agreed to be merely bound by their respective commitments under the OECD 
Codes of Liberalisation and Capital Movements and the GATS. See Sauvé and Molinuevo (May 2008) for 
a discussion of the different approaches. 
  12the same level of market opening (even as they do not afford the same degree of 
regulatory transparency) or level of treatment (protection) to investors.  
 





















Source: Adapted from Sauvé and Molinuevo (May 2008). 
 
It is worth noting the preference accorded to a dedicated financial services 
chapter by an increasing number of countries nowadays. The main reason for its 
appeal is its flexibility with respect to scheduling financial services-specific commitments 
and obligations. In NAFTA-type agreements, this approach has led to innovative 
scheduling of reservations (mix of positive and negative listing depending on sub-sector 
and mode) and disciplines (differences between cross-border trade and investment in 
financial services), although these have to be weighed against the increased complexity 
of managing the agreement’s implementation. Dedicated chapters on financial services 
are also used for purposes of circumscribing the extent to which investors and 
investments in financial services are subject to various investment provisions, particularly 
as regards investor-state arbitration. One additional, less often-mentioned reason for its 
attractiveness is that such an approach allows financial sector policymakers to stay ‘in the 
driver’s seat’ of financial services negotiations on account of its regulatory sensitivities, 
since they will be subsequently called upon to implement any commitments made. 
 
The scheduling of commitments on financial services often shies away from pure 
negative listing. Most agreements have followed GATS-style hybrid lists in scheduling 
commitments on financial services, or have introduced a positive listing of sectors for 
cross-border services, even as they resort to negative lists under services and/or 
investment chapters. Once again, this reflects countries’ sensitivities to certain forms of 
trade, particularly cross-border commitments that might involve capital flows. 
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Implications for China 
 
China’s CEPAs with Hong Kong SAR and Macau SAR represent a unique 
approach covering financial services that is unlikely to be replicated in other PTAs. 
In particular, the text of these two agreements does not contain any general disciplines or 
services-specific obligations. The obligations of the Parties stem from the list of specific 
commitments adopted by China. The lack of general disciplines and of a rules-based 
dispute settlement mechanism, as well as the need to refer at all times to the schedules of 
commitments to assess the precise scope of market opening may not make this approach 
particularly attractive to countries that wish to provide for broad commitments in a 
greater number of sectors, and signal such undertakings to foreign investors and services 
suppliers. As for financial services, the lack of generally binding disciplines, such as 
market access or national treatment, make unnecessary the introduction of a prudential 
carve-out, or other regulatory provisions. It is debatable whether such a high degree of 
regulatory discretion would prove attractive to other WTO members, particularly 
developed country partners, or indeed to Chinese operators in its future PTAs. 
 
China may wish to adopt a more sector-specific orientation when including 
financial services in future PTAs. The existence of different architectural approaches 
suggests that there is no unique model that all countries should aspire to; specific PTA 
circumstances will largely determine the approach taken. In addition, the choice of 
template should be commensurate with a country’s level of comfort and/or ambition with 
market opening in different modes and sub-sectors. However, international experience to-
date suggests that coverage of financial services by a dedicated chapter seems to capture 
the common interests of the Parties in providing for substantial liberalization disciplines, 
and allows them to tailor such disciplines to the particularities of the financial services 
sector. To the extent that China wants to ‘customize’ its financial services commitments 
and obligations or to limit any unforeseen consequences from them, it might be worth 
adopting a more sector-specific orientation via a self-contained financial services chapter. 
 
It is important for the authorities to be cognizant of important nuances between 
the two main negotiating templates. In particular, negotiators need to be aware of 
important differences in disciplines and commitments between the GATS and NAFTA 
templates as they relate to financial services, in order to avoid unintended consequences 
or limit policy space beyond what is desired
27. Examples in NAFTA-type agreements 
include the definition of financial services suppliers as regulated financial institutions; the 
relationship between financial services and other chapters; the denial of benefits clause; 
limits to state aid and to preferential arrangements for state-owned financial institutions; 
restrictions on the imposition of capital controls; existence of ratcheting and/or standstill 
clauses; and the use of a negative list approach. The dispute resolution mechanisms in 
financial services are also crucial given the limited degree of jurisprudence generated to 
trade in this sector within trade agreements, be it at the WTO or in PTAs
28.  
                                                 
27 See Saez (December 2005) for a discussion. 
28 The only relevant experience stems from the NAFTA and brings important lessons on the consequences 
of the structure of financial services commitments and obligations; see ICSID (July 2006) for details. 
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V. Preparing for Financial Services Negotiations 
 
Preparing for financial services negotiations is no different from preparations 
for negotiations in other sectors. As previously mentioned, trade agreements are 
essentially mercantilistic exercises in which demandeurs strive to enhance market access 
opportunities for their services providers rather than to promote mutual recognition or the 
harmonization of prudential standards. As such, it is important for the authorities to 
develop a strategy/roadmap for the negotiation process that allows them to classify 
offensive and defensive interests, identify “red lines”, anticipate requests and avoid 
surprises, as well as ensure the coherence of positions by resolving any internal 
inconsistencies that could weaken the negotiating stance. Some good practices adopted 




Negotiating financial services in PTAs – international experience
30 
 
The structure of the financial services negotiations team tends to be similar 
across countries, although its leadership tends to be country-specific. In particular, 
the financial services negotiating team typically includes, or relies upon, financial sector 
officials – ministry of finance, central bank, deposit insurance and supervisory agencies – 
in addition to trade specialists. This is an inevitable consequence of the fact that the 
financial sector is heavily regulated for prudential and market conduct purposes, which 
requires a high level of technical expertise. Cultural and institutional factors – historical 
involvement, degree of trust and knowledge, relative political powers etc. – are important 
determinants of whether it is financial or trade officials that lead negotiations in the 
sector
31. Leadership of the negotiating process will sometimes (though not always) 
determine the negotiating template, with ministries of finance and central banks typically 
opting for a dedicated financial services chapter to isolate the negotiations from other 
chapters and to keep them among financial sector specialists. However, even in such 
cases, they need to interact with negotiators and stay abreast of developments of 
negotiations in other chapters that are relevant for the financial sector
32. 
 
The consultation process with the private sector and civil society on financial 
services negotiations differs substantially across countries. As an analysis of a sample 
                                                 
29 See Saez (July 2007) for a discussion on preparing for a bilateral negotiation in financial services. 
30 See Saez (December 2006), Arbeláez, Flórez and Salazar (August 2006), and Echandi (September 2006) 
on the financial services negotiations strategy and process for Chile, Colombia and Costa Rica respectively. 
31 For example, it was the Ministry of Finance that led the negotiations process in the Chilean (Chile-USA 
FTA, Chile-EC AA) and Colombian (Colombia-USA FTA) cases, although it was the Ministry of Trade 
that led negotiations for Costa Rica (CAFTA-US-DR FTA). In the case of the USA, the USTR handles 
insurance negotiations and the Treasury handles negotiations in other financial services. 
32 Strictly speaking, a financial services chapter does not fully capture all domestic financial system 
activities, such as foreign investment in domestic non-financial securities, activities of non-regulated 
financial institutions (in NAFTA-type agreements), provisions on payments and capital movements, and 
elements of a country’s ‘financial infrastructure’ (e.g. accounting services) and of financial institutions’ 
functions (e.g. data processing, telecoms, legal and taxation services). 
  15of LCR FTAs shows (see Appendix I), the scope and frequency of consultations depend 
on the perceived importance and sensitivity of financial services in the overall PTA 
negotiations. The consultation process with the financial industry is typically extensive, 
and consists of measures ranging from information sessions with financial institutions 
and relevant associations to “side room” participation by those actors during the 
negotiations and their feedback/commissioning of reports on negotiating positions. The 
process often includes, at least in the early stages, training on trade law concepts and 
principles to enhance the understanding of the private sector on the full scope and 
business implications of the negotiations. The consultation process with civil society 




Use of a trade-related regulatory audit in financial services can facilitate the 
negotiations and potentially generate positive spillovers in the consultation process 
and in domestic regulatory conduct and design
34. Use of this audit was pioneered in 
the context of preparing the negative lists of non-conforming measures under the 
NAFTA
35. Conducting such an audit is a useful means of preparing for services 
negotiations (to master the sectoral intricacies), ensuring that key regulatory objectives 
are met in the most efficient manner, identifying antiquated or inefficient regulations 
(which can then yield useful negotiating currency), encouraging the adoption of pro-
competitive regulation (where feasible), and deepening the dialogue and building trust 
within the government (trade negotiators, line ministries and sectoral regulators) as well 
as with key stakeholders. Therefore, the process of preparing an inventory of 
discriminatory and trade- and investment-impairing measures may help not only to 
anticipate partner country negotiating requests, but serve as an exercise in regulatory 
transparency and generate positive spillovers in the way that domestic regulation is 
developed and implemented. However, it is worth noting that the preparation of the list of 
non-conforming measures is a useful starting point in financial services but it is usually 
not sufficient given the presence of non-discriminatory measures, including measures of a 
prudential nature, which may nonetheless be unduly burdensome or possible disguised 
restrictions to trade.  
 
Implications for China 
 
Securing the active collaboration of financial sector officials in financial services 
negotiations would be of great benefit to Chinese trade negotiators. As previously 
mentioned, negotiators need to be aware of important nuances in financial services 
disciplines and commitments in order to avoid unintended consequences or limit policy 
space beyond what is desired. Given prevailing regulatory complexities and policy 
                                                 
33 For example, in the case of the Chile, there were no financial services-specific consultations due to 
perceived lack of interest and the technical nature of the discussions, while in the case of Costa Rica they 
included public presentations following each negotiating round as well as a broad communications strategy. 
34 See Sauvé (May 2008) for details. 
35 This corresponds to a negative list of measures that, absent their inscription in reservation lists, would be 
found in breach of the key liberalizing provisions found in trade agreements – national treatment, market 
access (quantitative restrictions), local presence requirements, and most favored nation (MFN) treatment. 
  16sensitivities, the input of financial sector officials – who will, after all, be responsible for 
implementing any commitments that are made – is critical. This is a challenging process 
in most countries because of the existence of institutional silos and attendant bureaucratic 
turf battles, differing interests and policy ‘languages’ used by financial and trade 
officials. The creation of institutionalized collaboration mechanisms (as opposed to 
relying solely on ad hoc or personal contacts) and the active participation of financial 
sector officials in the negotiations (as opposed to being passive recipients of information) 
would greatly facilitate this process. Developing a trade-related regulatory audit approach 
in financial services can serve as a conduit for discussions between financial sector and 
trade officials, and it can facilitate such a ‘whole-of-government’ cooperation process. 
 
Developing a robust consultation process with non-governmental stakeholders 
will also enhance the effectiveness of financial services negotiators.  T o  b e  i n  a  
position to make informed and meaningful negotiating offers and requests, a country 
requires knowledge of the export potential or priorities of its domestic service suppliers, 
and needs to feel confident of its ability to manage the regulatory, sectoral and economy-
wide implications of its own commitments. This cannot be achieved merely by 
consultations within government: as financial services get covered in future PTAs and as 
Chinese financial institutions develop the expertise and incentives to expand abroad, 
strengthening domestic processes of policy dialogue and consultations with key 
stakeholders in the private sector and civil society will assume heightened importance. 
Although the scope and frequency of such consultations vary widely across countries, 
they have nevertheless represented an important exercise in transparency and in 
enhancing the legitimacy of negotiated outcomes. 
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Appendix I: Lessons from Latin America and the Caribbean 
 
PTA developments in LCR 
 
Since the 1990s, the world economy in general – and LCR in particular – has 
witnessed an unprecedented proliferation of PTAs. Almost every WTO Member is 
party to at least one PTA, and LCR has been particularly active in this regard with trade 
agreements ranging from FTAs to custom unions and common markets.  
 
Two LCR countries in particular – Mexico and Chile – have been the initial 
driving forces behind the proliferation of PTAs in the region over the last decade, 
although other countries have also recently joined the fray. The entry into force of the 
NAFTA between Mexico, the US and Canada in 1994 is widely considered as a defining 
event in developing countries’ attempts to engage in PTAs in order to secure greater 
access to key markets and consolidate recent domestic reforms. The proliferation of 
PTAs in recent years can be explained by political, strategic and economic reasons that 
may differ depending on the level of development of participating countries. In general, 
these agreements are considered relatively easier and faster to negotiate, particularly in 
markets where geographic or cultural proximity matters. Such agreements may also allow 
for progress in areas where multilateral reforms are less advanced. 
 
North-South agreements take the form of FTAs, while some South-South 
agreements aim for a higher level of economic/political integration at a sub-regional 
level via customs unions and common markets. The four main South-South PTAs in 
LCR are the Southern Cone Common Market (MERCOSUR, established in 1991), the 
Andean Community (CAN, established in 1969), the Caribbean Community and Common 
Market (CARICOM, established in 1973) and the Central America Common Market 
(CACM, originally established in 1960 and reinstated in 1991). 
 
Coverage of financial services in LCR PTAs 
 
Financial services are typically covered via provisions included in a separate, 
self-contained chapter. This chapter is, for analytical purposes, the principal vehicle for 
influencing the operations of the domestic financial system although, strictly speaking, it 
does not fully capture all such activities
36. The treatment of financial services by PTAs in 
LCR follows 3 main approaches: 
  no coverage because of the exclusion of services in general, or of financial 
services in particular, from the scope of a particular trade agreement
37 
                                                 
36 Areas relevant to the domestic financial system that are not captured by the financial services chapter 
include foreign investments in domestic non-financial securities, activities of non-regulated financial 
institutions (only in NAFTA-type agreements), provisions on payments and capital movements, as well as 
accounting, data processing, telecoms, legal and taxation services. 
37 Some of these PTAs include an obligation to negotiate a financial services chapter some time after the 
entry into force of the agreement. 
  18  direct coverage via the inclusion of dedicated provisions in a separate 
chapter or annex dealing exclusively with financial services 
  indirect coverage via ‘horizontal’ provisions of a more generic character 
covering services and/or investment that partly apply to financial services.  
 
The vast majority of PTAs with financial services chapters that were negotiated 
by LCR countries have followed the NAFTA model. This is partly explained by the 
role played by Mexico in using the NAFTA template in its own subsequent FTAs. 
Because of the experience acquired in negotiating this type of FTA and the influence of 
the US, other LCR countries have developed templates similar to NAFTA in their own 
PTAs. Recent agreements (e.g. EU-Mexico and EU-Chile FTAs) have introduced some 
changes to the traditional template, by mixing in elements of the GATS, NAFTA, and of 
the GATS’s Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services. In the case of FTAs 
negotiated with the US, the NAFTA template still serves as the basis for the treatment of 
financial services, but provisions from the GATS have also been incorporated
38. 
 























Note: Lines indicate the existence of a financial services chapter/Annex in a FTA between the relevant 
countries (dashed lines indicate that the agreement has not yet been ratified or implemented), while the 
ovals indicate the presence of a trade agreement for the creation of a common market or customs union. 
 
                                                 
38 Examples include the adoption of a positive-list approach for the cross-border supply of financial 
services, the treatment of potentially sensitive information, as well as the introduction of a binding – as 
opposed to “best endeavors” as in NAFTA – market access provision listing the types of restrictive 
measures that Parties cannot adopt or maintain with regard to investors or providers of another Party. 
  19The proliferation of PTAs in recent years has contributed to greater financial 
services liberalization commitments for many LCR countries and led to an 
increasingly complex regional ‘commitments map’ (or financial services ‘spaghetti 
bowl’). Most progress in financial services rule-making and market opening has been 
achieved via FTAs; by contrast, LCR countries that have relied on the multilateral 
framework and on sub-regional customs unions have not made much progress to-date 
(see Figure 1). 
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Note: A foreign bank is defined to have at least 50 percent foreign ownership. Figures reported represent 
averages over 2000-2004 in each country. South-owned banks are foreign banks headquartered in a 
developing country. 
 
The inclusion of financial services in LCR PTAs depends greatly on whether it is 
a North-South or South-South agreement. Unsurprisingly, developed countries in 
North-South agreements have been the main proponents of including financial services.  
Most LCR countries are net importers of financial services and have few – if any – 
perceived ‘offensive’ interests linked to a “demandeur” or domestic constituency, both of 
which lessen the scope for striking reciprocal bargains within the sector. Conversely, the 
inclusion of financial services in most North-South agreements likely reflects the fact that 
the majority of foreign financial institutions in LCR countries are headquartered in 
developed countries (see Figure 2), as well as the relative (and asymmetric) bargaining 
powers between the negotiating counterparts. In fact, only two LCR countries have 
tended to include financial services chapters in South-South agreements – Mexico 
  20(primarily in the immediate post-NAFTA period
39) and Panama (which is an offshore 
financial center and a net exporter of financial services). 
 
Country case studies: negotiating team, strategy and consultation process  
 
An analysis of financial services chapters has been undertaken for a sample of 
LCR countries that have recently participated in FTAs (Chile, Colombia and Costa 
Rica)
40. These comprise the Chile-US and Chile-EU FTAs, the (yet to be ratified) 
Colombia-US FTA and the DR-CAFTA as it applies to Costa Rica. The results strongly 
indicate that each country’s financial services-related strategy and negotiating 
structure/process were shaped by initial conditions and historical experience. 
 
Chile: Chile had unilaterally liberalized its domestic financial system following the 
1982 crisis, and enjoyed strong macroeconomic and financial stability at the time of FTA 
negotiations. Its only previous financial services commitments were made in the GATS, 
and the FTA with the US was seen as an opportunity to set a precedent with other 
countries. It was decided to negotiate a separate, self-contained financial services chapter 
independently of other areas (whenever possible) to comfort financial supervisors and 
market players, with the Ministry of Finance undertaking full responsibility for it. The 
negotiating stance was aimed at locking-in the status quo, both because the authorities 
were comfortable with the existing (very high) level of market openness, and because 
they perceived FTAs as a “third-best alternative” for trade liberalization, behind 
unilateral and multilateral trade negotiations. The right to introduce capital controls and 
limitations on Balance of Payments transfers was the most politically sensitive issue, and 
was negotiated separately by a small team of specialists from the Ministry and the Central 
Bank. While the private sector was involved via meetings with financial industry 
associations and the commissioning of a study on the FTA effects, there were no broad 
consultations with civil society or other stakeholders in the area of financial services. 
 
Colombia: At the time of FTA negotiations with the US, the Colombian financial 
system was still recovering from the effects of the 1998 crisis, which had also disrupted 
the progressive market opening process of the 1990s. Prior to the FTA, Colombia had 
made (limited) financial services commitments in the GATS and the G3 (with Mexico 
and Venezuela). The negotiating process for the financial services chapter was led by the 
Ministry of Finance, with the collaboration of the financial supervisors. Since the 
negotiations with the US were initially scheduled to take place at the same time for 
several Andean countries, Colombia coordinated with its peers to reach common 
negotiating positions whenever possible (e.g. on social security and collective 
investments). In particular, there was an exclusive emphasis on defensive interests and an 
attempt to prevent a non-level playing field that was perceived to arise from various US 
                                                 
39 The NAFTA was the first FTA by a LCR country that included trade in financial services within its 
scope and devoted a specific self-contained chapter to such trade. Subsequently, Mexico has been a key 
player in incorporating financial services in its preferential trade agreements; of the twelve PTAs (all are 
FTAs) entered into by Mexico, seven contain a financial services chapter. 
40 See Saez (December 2006), Arbeláez., Flórez and Salazar (August 2006), and Echandi (September 2006) 
for the cases of Chile, Colombia and Costa Rica respectively. 
  21demands (e.g. insurance/bank branching and certain cross-border trade activities). The 
private sector was actively involved via ‘side room’ participation and preparation of 
relevant studies by financial industry associations; public presentations also followed 
each negotiating round. 
 
Costa Rica: Costa Rica enjoyed a high degree of market openness but significant 
state ownership (particularly in the insurance sector) at the time of DR-CAFTA 
negotiations. The only previous financial services commitments that it had made were in 
the GATS. Unlike the other two countries, it was the Ministry of Commerce – with 
support from financial supervisors – that took responsibility for preparing the 
negotiations ‘roadmap’ in financial services. The 5 Central American countries had 
created a joint negotiating team vis-à-vis the US, and a coordination protocol and 
common objectives for financial services were agreed. These were sufficiently flexible to 
accommodate offensive interests, although Costa Rica (which acted as the secretariat of 
the negotiation process) only had defensive interests in this sector. Given Costa Rica’s 
institutional and cultural experience, extensive consultation mechanisms with the private 
sector and with civil society were utilized. 
 
Figure 3: Market Access Commitments – Proportion of Financial Services 
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Note: Three levels of market access commitments are applied in the above analysis by financial services 
sub-sector and mode: none (value of zero), partial (value of 0.5) and full commitment (value of 1). Mode 4 
commitments, as well as all national treatment commitments and horizontal restrictions, are excluded. All 
pre-commitments to liberalize additional sub-sectors and/or modes in future years are included. 
 
 
  22Financial services liberalization commitments compared to the GATS 
 
An analysis of market access and national treatment commitments scheduled in 
the financial services chapters for the aforementioned sample of LCR FTAs 
provides evidence of significant additional liberalization commitments when 
compared to the GATS. This is not unusual given the time elapsed and the (unilateral) 
market opening undertaken by these countries since the mid-1990s. Additional 
commitments tend to span all financial sub-sectors, including those that were not well 
covered in the GATS, such as insurance, securities-related and other financial services. 
The same is true in modal terms, with significant new commitments particularly in mode 
2. Commitments are in general more extensive across all modes for FTAs involving the 
US, particularly for mode 2. By contrast, mode 1 commitments, while better than what 
has been harvested to date under the GATS, remain relatively more timid (see Figure 3).  
 
Financial services liberalization commitments compared to the status quo  
 
De novo liberalization – which has chiefly taken the form of pre-commitments to 
future market opening – is relatively rare for the sample of LCR countries under 
review. An analysis of individual LCR country experiences is much more difficult to 
undertake because of insufficient information on the regulatory status quo prior to, during 
and after the implementation of such trade agreements. Apart from Costa Rica’s 
insurance sector that was opened for the first time as a result of its FTA with the United 
States, real liberalization appears to have mostly taken place in the cross-border provision 
of some insurance services, as well as in asset management and auxiliary financial 
services. Although there is limited available data on the actual market size of these sub-
sectors and modes, anecdotal evidence suggests that they are relatively less important 
than ‘core’ banking services. However, the abolition of numerical quotas (e.g. economic 
needs test) and certain juridical restrictions on forms of entry (e.g. insurance branching
41) 
might also contribute to further liberalization in other sub-sectors under mode 3. 
 
The above findings offer strong indications that, with few exceptions, PTAs are 
primarily used to consolidate and ‘lock in’ existing unilateral liberalization rather 
than as means to actively promote further market opening and the process of 
domestic regulatory reform. The fact that the LCR countries under review appear to 
have already largely liberalized their domestic financial systems on a unilateral basis 
prior to their engagement in PTA negotiations has also contributed to this outcome.  
 
Of course, consolidation of the regulatory status quo and the application of 
certain disciplines in trade agreements remain important because they can limit the 
arbitrary use (and abuse) of ‘policy space’ by host country authorities. New 
disciplines such as those on regulatory transparency, as well as the lock-in of the current 
policy regime via commitments, standstill and ratcheting clauses, enhance predictability, 
prevent potentially costly policy reversals, and can thus benefit both domestic and foreign 
                                                 
41 However, it should be noted that domestic authorities retain the right to regulate such branches as they 
deem necessary for prudential purposes, including via the establishment of local capital requirements. 
  23financial services providers and local consumers. It is therefore conceivable that a PTA 
could exert positive impact on the business environment (including for financial services) 
even if real liberalization commitments remain limited to the status quo. However, the 
issue of policy space is a double-edged sword, and policymakers need to decide on the 
level of policy flexibility and regulatory discretion that properly balances policy 
considerations that go beyond trade liberalization objectives per se. Linked to this issue is 
the need for policymakers negotiating the financial services provisions of PTAs to be 
cognizant of the important nuances in disciplines and commitments that might create 
unintended consequences or limit policy space beyond what was envisaged. The short 
time span since the entry into force of most PTAs means that their contribution – whether 
anticipated or unanticipated – still cannot be fully assessed. 
 
Preferential nature of de novo liberalization commitments  
 
An interesting additional finding of the analysis is that many de novo 
liberalization commitments are actually not preferential in nature. While some 
commitments (e.g. the abolition of an economic needs test for Chile) are country-specific 
and benefit the financial services providers of the PTA counterpart, others (e.g. 
permitting branching or opening up the insurance industry to private providers for Costa 
Rica) require new ‘horizontal’ regulations or laws that would apply to the entire industry 
and could actually benefit financial service providers from third countries. Therefore, 
unlike trade in goods, the extent to which financial services commitments were 
preferential was not primarily determined by rules of origin
42. This result would seem to 
suggest that there might not always be important first-mover advantages or serious 
economic distortions created by using PTAs to promote market opening in financial 
services, although much depends on whether the relevant liberalization commitments are 
actually preferential in nature.  
 
Comparing ‘architectural’ models for liberalization purposes 
 
Based on the experience of the 3 countries that were analyzed, it is unclear 
whether GATS- or NAFTA-type ‘architectural’ models actually lead to greater 
liberalization in financial services. A simple review of the FTAs mentioned above 
would seem to favor the negative list approach and broader rules and disciplines 
embedded in NAFTA-type agreements, primarily on grounds of heightened regulatory 
transparency, but this can be largely attributed to the involvement of the US in many such 
agreements. In addition, it has been argued
43 that the direction of causality between 
scheduling approaches and the level of liberalization commitments can run both ways. 
Moreover, even NAFTA-type agreements have tended to use a hybrid list for financial 
service commitments – in fact, both models have introduced new features in recent years 
that borrow from each other, revealing signs of convergence around a hybrid approach.  
                                                 
42 Provisions on denial of benefits – also known as rules of origin – allow parties to a PTA to deny the 
benefits of the agreement to a financial services supplier that is not owned or controlled by nationals of the 
other party. These provisions can be important because their restrictiveness helps determine the extent of 
preferential treatment entailed in market opening commitments undertaken by the parties. 
43 See, for example, Fink and Molinuevo (June 2007). 
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